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Résumé : Dans cet article, j’entends décrire comment évolue la philosophie
de la physique de Weyl au cours de la période 1918-1927. Je rappellerai en
particulier qu’il développe différentes formes d’« apriorisme » entre 1918 et
1923 : un apriorisme « spéculatif » avec sa théorie unifiée des champs (1918-
1921), puis une conception des connaissances a priori largement inspirée de la
Wesensanalyse de Husserl dans ses travaux sur le problème de l’espace (1921-
1923). Je montrerai par ailleurs que le holisme de Weyl, i.e., la thèse selon
laquelle seule une théorie physique envisagée comme un tout peut faire l’objet
de tests empiriques, occupe le devant de la scène dès 1924-1925 dans des textes
qui portent sur les fondements des mathématiques. Ce holisme est étroitement
lié à sa conception de la théorie physique comme construction symbolique de
la réalité. Au bout du compte je caractériserai le point de vue holiste de Weyl
en le comparant à certaines réflexions développées par Cassirer, Einstein et
Hilbert à peu près au même moment.
Abstract: In this paper, I intend to describe the evolution of Weyl’s
philosophy of physics during the period 1918-1927. In particular, I will recall
that he developed different versions of “apriorism” between 1918 and 1923:
first a so-called “speculative” apriorism associated with his unified field theory
(1918-1921) and second a conception of a priori knowledge mainly inspired
by Husserl’s Wesensanalyse with his work on the problem of space (1921-
1923). I will also show that Weyl’s “holism”—i.e., the thesis according to
which only a physical theory as a whole can be subject to empirical tests—
came to the forefront in 1924-1925 in texts on the foundations of mathematics.
This holism is closely related to his definition of a physical theory as a symbolic
construction of reality. Finally, I will characterize Weyl’s holistic viewpoint
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by comparing it to the thoughts developed by Cassirer, Einstein and Hilbert
around the same time.
1 Introduction
From his early work on general relativity (1917-1918) to his main papers
on quantum mechanics (1927-1928), Weyl made substantial changes in his
philosophy of physics. E. Scholz has pointed out, in [Scholz 2004, 2011],
that Weyl’s publications devoted to his purely infinitesimal geometry and his
problem of space were related to different versions of “apriorism”, whereas his
later texts in quantum mechanics expressed a kind of “empirical turn”. In this
article, I would like first to offer a better understanding of Weyl’s apriorism
between 1918 and 1923. To this end, I will refer to a broader philosophical
controversy, which opposed at that particular time Arthur Erich Haas and
Weyl to Hans Reichenbach and Erwin Freundlich. To my knowledge, this
controversy has been studied only partially by T. Ryckman in [Ryckman 2005].
Moreover, contrary to M. Friedman [Friedman 1999], I will show that Kant’s
transcendental idealism as such represents a marginal source of inspiration in
Weyl’s work on his unified field theory as well as on his problem of space,
although he uses a Kantian vocabulary in both cases.
Then, I intend to underline the importance of an intermediate step between
Weyl’s early apriorism and his later empirical turn: his clear adhesion to a
kind of confirmational holism which came to the forefront in the mid-1920s.
From 1924 onward, Weyl published a series of texts on the Brouwer-Hilbert
controversy;1 in those papers, he claimed that only a physical theory as a
whole can be empirically tested. Moreover, it appears that Ernst Cassirer,
Albert Einstein, David Hilbert and Weyl shared this holistic viewpoint
during the 1920s. So, I would like to single out the characteristic features
of Weyl’s holism, by relating it to the thoughts developed by Cassirer,
Einstein and Hilbert on physical theories. Already in [Sieroka 2010], we
can find a very precise comparison between Cassirer’s and Weyl’s respective
conceptions of a physical theory. I would like to go one step further by also
referring to Einstein and Hilbert.
In section 1, I will describe Weyl’s early “speculative” apriorism,2 which
characterizes his thoughts in 1918-1921, and I will study very carefully the
so-called Freundlich-Haas-Reichenbach-Weyl controversy on the role played
by geometry and a priori knowledge in general relativity. In section 2, I will
review the changes encountered by Weyl’s philosophy of physics in his work
on the so-called problem of space. He developed in particular a new kind of
1. See in particular [Weyl 1924, 1925].
2. See also [Scholz 2011, 185–192].
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apriorism based on a specific interpretation of Husserl’s Wesensanalyse that
differed significantly from Carnap’s.3 In the last section, I will progressively
characterize Weyl’s holism, which became central in his thoughts from 1924
onward and which is intrinsically related to his definition of a physical theory
as a symbolic construction of reality.
2 Weyl’s speculative apriorism
under debate (1918-1921)
In a recent paper, E. Scholz has used the expression “speculative-a priori
validity claim” [i.e., spekulativ-apriorischer Geltungsanspruch] to describe
Weyl’s philosophical attitude toward geometry and physics when working on
his project of a unified field theory (1918-1921) [Scholz 2011, 185–192]. I will go
in depth into E. Scholz’s analysis in two ways: first, it is necessary to elaborate
more extensively why the expression “speculative apriorism” is particularly
relevant in order to characterize Weyl’s early philosophy of physics; second, I
will focus on an important philosophical controversy opposing Haas and Weyl
to Freundlich and Reichenbach in 1919-1921.
2.1 A characterization of Weyl’s early “apriorism”
Before analyzing Weyl’s philosophical views from 1918 to 1921, I would
like to emphasize that “apriorism” can refer indistinctly to philosophical
interpretations of special and general relativity that are quite different, or
even opposed. For instance, Cassirer and Reichenbach developed almost
simultaneously two opposite versions of a so-called “relativized” apriorism.
On the one hand, in his book entitled Zur Einsteinschen Relativitätstheorie,
Cassirer interpreted general covariance as a “regulative idea4 of all fundamen-
tal physical objects interacting through dynamical laws completely without
reference to a background space-time” [Ryckman 2005, 46]. As a consequence,
this principle “is no longer constitutively a priori in Kant’s sense” [Ryckman
2005, 46]. On the other hand, in his book entitled Relativitätstheorie und
Erkenntnis a priori, Reichenbach temporarily built up a weaker form of
apriorism, based on the distinction between two different meanings of a priori
knowledge: (a) constitutive of the concept of an object; (b) apodictically true.
He rejected the second meaning before interpreting coordination principles in
physics as a priori statements in a weak sense.
3. See [Carnap 1922] and [Friedman 1999] for a commentary on this point.
4. According to Cassirer, general covariance plays a central role in securing the
systematic unity of empirical knowledge and it can thus be considered as a regulative
idea.
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“Apriorism” is also a category employed by the actors of the time
in the context of philosophical controversies. For instance, in a famous
conference entitled “Die philosophische Bedeutung der Relativitätstheorie”, the
philosopher Moritz Geiger, a former student of Husserl, opposed “apriorism”
to “positivism” and “empiricist realism”. He strongly criticized a version of
positivism inherited from Ernst Mach and represented by Joseph Petzoldt.
He also rejected a so-called empiricist realism embodied by Hermann von
Helmholtz. Finally, Geiger’s conference turned into a plaidoyer for “apriorism”
[Geiger 1921, 25].
I would like to offer now a threefold characterization of Weyl’s early
apriorism. In the first place, contrary to Cassirer and Reichenbach, Weyl
did not introduce a kind of relativized (synthetic) a priori knowledge in
his early work on special and general relativity. Moreover, until 1923, he
was convinced that a clear demarcation line between a priori principles and
empirical statements could be drawn in physics.
In the second place, Weyl did not focus on Kant’s transcendental idealism
as such in his philosophical reflections on general relativity. His early apriorism
depended upon various sources, mainly Johann Gottlieb Fichte and Edmund
Husserl, to whom he referred almost simultaneously.5
In the third place, Weyl’s “speculative” apriorism was based above all
on his conviction that geometry prevails over physics. This idea reflects his
close links with the Göttingen School of mathematical physics around Hilbert,
although the latter would harshly criticize Weyl’s project of a unified field
theory in 1919-1920.6 Indeed, already in the first edition of Raum, Zeit,
Materie, Weyl drew a parallel between Riemannian geometry and action-
by-contact physics [Weyl 1918b, 81]. Far from being a marginal remark,
this thought completely determined Weyl’s investigations in mathematical
physics at that time: since he is convinced that there exists a well-coordinated
development of infinitesimal geometry and action-by-contact physics, he
strongly believes that his generalization of Riemannian geometry can naturally
receive a meaningful interpretation in physics.
Weyl already recognized in 1918 that this way of deducing a physical theory
from his so-called purely infinitesimal geometry belongs to “pure speculation”.
At that particular time, such an expression implied that his theory was
awaiting an empirical validation. For instance, in [Weyl 1918a, 38], he uses the
expression “in pure speculation” [im rein Spekulativen], while trying to find a
physical ground for his theory. Moreover, in his response to Einstein’s main
objection—according to which, the length of a standard rod and the speed
of a standard clock would depend on their “prehistory” [Vorgeschichte] in the
5. See in particular [Scholz 2005] and [Ryckman 2005].
6. For a careful analysis of this point, see in particular [Scholz 2011] and [Eckes
2014].
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framework of Weyl’s unified field theory7—, he concedes that there is still no
empirical ground for his theory, before employing the term “speculation” to
describe his approach: “we are dealing here with pure speculation; comparison
with experiment is an understood requirement”.8 Despite this concession,
Weyl rejects Einstein’s objection by supposing that the metric introduced in
his geometry is not bound to direct observation [Weyl 1918a, 42].
At this point, I would tend to underline a provisional tension in Weyl’s
argument: on the one hand, he makes a clear distinction between “the
mathematical ideal of vector-transfer” and “the real situation regarding the
movement of a clock”; on the other hand, he believes that the (mathematical)
superiority of his geometry over Riemannian geometry must be reflected
in nature. After 1921, he remained convinced that his geometry was
mathematically more relevant than Riemannian geometry, while admitting
that his early project of a unified field theory belonged to “pure speculation”.




Einstein’s objections against Weyl’s unified field theory represent the first
step of a broader philosophical controversy that opposed Weyl and Haas to
Freundlich and Reichenbach. Weyl’s speculative approach lays at the very
core of this controversy. Let us recall briefly the chronology of this dispute.
The Austrian physicist Arthur Erich Haas argued in favor of Weyl’s
conception of geometry and physics in an article entitled “Die Physik als
geometrische Notwendigkeit” [Physics as geometric necessity] [Haas 1920].
According to Haas, the recent developments in special and general relativity
were based on purely geometric ideas. To this end, he referred in particular to
Hermann Minkowski’s conference on space and time [Haas 1920, 122], before
claiming arguably that
Einstein just needed to apply Riemann’s knowledge, which is
valid for an arbitrarily given geometric manifold, to Minkowski’s
universe [...], in order to build up a theory of gravitation on a
purely geometric ground.10
7. The first trace of this objection can be found in Einstein’s letter to Weyl from
April 15, 1918 [Einstein 1998, 720–721]. Einstein formulates again this objection in
a series of remarks at the end of [Weyl 1918a, 40].
8. [Weyl 1918a, 42]: “Es handelt sich hier wirklich um reine Spekulation; der
Vergleich mit der Erfahrung ist selbstverständliches Erfordernis.” English translation
in [O’Raifeartaigh 1997, 36].
9. See the last paragraph of the fifth edition of Raum, Zeit, Materie (1923), quoted
in [Scholz 2011, 189].
10. [Haas 1920, 124, my translation]: “Einstein brauchte nur die Erkenntnis
Riemanns, die für eine beliebige geometrische Mannigfaltigkeit [...] gilt, auf die
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According to Haas, Weyl’s unified field theory perfectly illustrates his
general thesis that “the foundations of physics are identical with those of
mathematics”.11
Haas’ viewpoint was firmly criticized by Erwin Freundlich in a short
response, also published in Die Naturwissenschaft [Freundlich 1920]. Contrary
to Haas, Freundlich claimed that special relativity is based above all on a
“purely physical knowledge” [rein physikalischen Erkenntnis] which consists in
unifying the postulate of relativity and the principle of lightspeed constancy
[Freundlich 1920, 234]. He also disproved Haas’ assumption according to which
Minkowski’s work might have foreshadowed Einstein’s later contributions
in general relativity. In particular, Freundlich considered that Einstein’s
gravitation theory cannot be interpreted as a mere extension of Minkowski’s
geometric ideas within a Riemannian framework [Freundlich 1920, 235].
Haas and Freundlich offer here two opposite, but also biased, views on
the historical development of special and general relativity. Haas focuses
almost exclusively on the geometric ideas governing these two theories,
whereas Freundlich insists mainly on their empirical grounds. Finally,
he shows that Haas favors almost exclusively the “mathematical-aesthetic
aspect” [mathematisch-ästhetischen Gesichtspunkt] of general relativity over
its physical content. According to Freundlich, Haas’ erroneous interpretation
of special and general relativity is based on the lack of any explicit distinction
between the physical grounds of these theories, their analytic representations
and the epistemological issues they raise.
In this short note, Freundlich does not refer to Weyl’s unified field theory.
Nevertheless, this first dispute extends very soon to Reichenbach and Weyl:
in his 1920 book on relativity theory, Reichenbach claims that Weyl and Haas
defend exactly the same unfounded point of view on mathematics and physics:
So it is entirely false if one would conclude, as. e.g., Weyl and
also Haas, that mathematics and physics merge into a single
discipline.12
Reichenbach mainly refers here to [Haas 1920] and to the concluding remarks
of [Weyl 1918b]. Indeed, in the last paragraph of [Weyl 1918b], Weyl
considers that geometry and physics have exactly the same character before
drawing a parallel between physics and formal logic. In this perspective, a
physical theory is viewed as a mere formal interpretation of reality. But
contrary to Reichenbach’s claim, Weyl does not identify purely and simply
Minkowskiwelt anzuwenden, um (1915) eine Theorie der Gravitation auf rein
geometrischer Grundlage aufstellen zu können.”
11. [Haas 1920, 127, my translation]: “Die Grundlagen der Physik sind dieselben
wie die der Mathematik.”
12. [Reichenbach 1920, 73]: “Ganz falsch ist es aber, wenn man daraus, wie z.B.
Weyl und auch Haas, wieder den Schluss ziehen will, dass Mathematik und Physik
zu einer einzigen Disziplin zusammenwachsen.” English translation in [Reichenbach
1965, 76].
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mathematics and physics.13 Reichenbach is also well aware of Einstein’s
main objection against Weyl’s theory and he points out a more general
epistemological inconsistency in Weyl’s reasoning, based on a confusion
between the mathematical significance of his purely infinitesimal geometry
and its (questionable) effectiveness in physics [Reichenbach 1920, 73]. If we
keep in mind Reichenbach’s general project of relativizing Kant’s conception
of a priori knowledge, his final criticism against Haas and Weyl is particularly
harsh: Reichenbach accuses them of defending a pre-Kantian viewpoint:
Physics is not a “geometrical necessity”; whoever asserts this
returns to the pre-Kantian point of view where it was a necessity
given by reason.14
Weyl advocates for the very last time for his unified field theory in [Weyl
1921b], which contains an interesting response to Freundlich and Reichenbach.
Indeed, Weyl sums up very briefly the main epistemological objection against
his theory:
From different sides, it has been objected against my theory that
it contains things derived a priori from pure speculation, while
they can only be settled by experiment.15
Then, he underlines the importance of an “a priori element” in the constitution
of any physical theory:
However, one should not forget that, in every knowledge of
reality, besides the collection of typical empirical facts, the
a priori element, [that is] the shaping of suitable intuitions and
concepts, whereby facts can only be interpreted, plays a non
negligible role.16
In other words, he is not convinced by Freundlich’s empiricist views or
even by Reichenbach’s way of relativizing the meaning and the scope of
a priori knowledge. Nevertheless, Weyl does not define this so-called “a priori
13. See Weyl’s letter to Reichenbach, February 02, 1921, Reichenbach archives,
Pittsburgh University, HR015-68-04, with a partial transcription in [Ryckman 2005,
262].
14. [Reichenbach 1920, 73–74]: “Die Physik ist eben keine ‘geometrische
Notwendigkeit’; wer das behauptet, kehrt auf den vorkantischen Standpunkt zurück
wo sie eine vernunftgegebene Notwendigkeit war.” English translation in [Reichenbach
1965, 77].
15. [Weyl 1921b, 231, my translation]: “Von verschiedenen Seiten ist gegen meine
Theorie eingewendet worden, dass in ihr aus reiner Spekulation Dinge a priori
demonstriert würden, über welche nur die Erfahrung entscheiden kann.” He mentions
especially [Freundlich 1920] and [Reichenbach 1920] in a footnote.
16. [Weyl 1921b, 236, my translation]: “Man darf aber nicht vergessen, dass in
aller Wirklichkeitserkenntnis neben dem Sammeln typischer Erfahrungstatsachen das
apriorische Element, die Bildung von angemessenen Anschauungen und Begriffen, mit
Hilfe deren die Tatsachen zu deuten sind, eine nicht zu vernachlässigende Rolle spielt.”
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element”, which covers “intuitions” [Anschauungen] and “concepts” [Begriffe].
He would clarify this point in several writings published between 1921 and
1923 on his problem of space. Indeed, he had already alluded to this problem
in [Weyl 1921b]. So, we might consider at least partially his philosophical
reflections on the problem of space as a final response to Freundlich’s and
Reichenbach’s criticisms.
3 A refinement of Weyl’s apriorism
between 1921 and 1923
In this second part, I will show first that Kant’s theory of knowledge
plays a minor role in Weyl’s philosophical reflections on the problem of
space. Second, it seems that the mathematical problem of space—as a
group-theoretical characterization of Pythagorean manifolds in a generalized
sense—prevails in his writings over the philosophical problem of space,
which consists in studying the interconnections between space, its metrical
structure and its material content. This might explain his very specific
interpretation of Husserl’s Wesensanalyse that has been rightly underlined
by M. Friedman in [Friedman 1999].
3.1 A non-Kantian use of Kant’s vocabulary
In Weyl’s work on the problem of space, we can find many traces reminding us
of Kant’s vocabulary. For instance in [Weyl 1923], Weyl distinguishes between
a priori and a posteriori knowledge, but also between analytic a priori and
synthetic a priori statements. Nevertheless, he does not define most of these
expressions in a Kantian perspective. Moreover, he harshly criticizes Kant’s
conception of space in many of his writings related to general relativity. In
other words, Weyl does not rehabilitate Kant’s conception of space at all.
Besides, we have to bear in mind that the expression “form of phenomena”
does not have exactly the same meaning in Weyl’s early writings on his purely
infinitesimal geometry and in his later texts on the problem of space. To our
knowledge, this change has not been taken into account in [Bernard 2015].
Indeed, at the beginning of [Weyl 1918c], Weyl gives his first own
mathematical interpretation of space-time as “a form of appearances” [Form
der Erscheinungen] [Weyl 1918c, 2]. Under this expression, he means a
completely amorphous four-dimensional continuum in the sense of Analysis
situs, i.e., a four-dimensional topological manifold. This definition is not
inspired by Kant for three main reasons. First, Weyl does not separate space
and time. Second, he distinguishes between the “form of appearances” and
“matter” as a physical entity; in other words, he never employs the expression
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“matter of appearances”,17 which corresponds to sensations in a Kantian
perspective. Third, he interprets this distinction in terms of mathematical
properties ascribed to a four-dimensional manifold: its topological (and
differentiable) structure which can be described fully a priori, as opposed to
its metrical structure which is determined only a posteriori because it depends
on the distribution of matter.
The use of Kant’s vocabulary is even more explicit in Weyl’s writings on his
problem of space. For instance, at the beginning of [Weyl 1922a], Weyl divides
reality according to its form (the spatiotemporal extensive medium) and its
qualitative content. Then, he summarizes in a few words a so-called “pre-
relativistic conception of space” [vorrelativistische Auffassung des Raumes]
[Weyl 1922a, 212], in which the metric is conceived independently from any
material content. Kant’s transcendental aesthetic can precisely serve as an
example of this misleading conception. As a consequence, Weyl draws a clear
opposition between Kant’s and Einstein’s points of view on space and time.
Accordingly, Weyl’s apriorism cannot be considered as an attempt to make
Kantianism compatible with special and general relativity. I disagree here with
M. Friedman’s interpretation [Friedman 1999, 51]: Friedman overestimates by
far the importance of a so-called “Kantian context” in his interpretation of
Weyl’s writings from the period 1921-1923.
In fact, Weyl discusses Kant’s transcendental aesthetic—in particular the
definition of space as a pure form of intuition [A 22-A 23 and B36-B 37]—in
light of general relativity in [Weyl 1923, 43–47]:
According to Einstein, the metric structure of the universe is
not homogeneous. How is it possible, since space and time are
forms of phenomena? Only because the metric structure is not
a priori fixed, on the contrary it is a field of physical reality which
is causally dependent on the state of matter.18
According to J. Bernard [Bernard 2015, 263], who refers precisely to this
passage, Weyl tries to rehabilitate in a certain manner Kant’s conception of
space and time as forms of phenomena by keeping a “homogeneity that is
weak [...] and infinitesimal”. This interpretation is not completely convincing
for several reasons. First, Weyl never defines homogeneity in a weak sense in
[Weyl 1923, 44–45]. Moreover, the question he raises—i.e., “How is it possible
[that the metric structure of the universe is not homogeneous], since space
and time are forms of phenomena?”—is purely rhetorical. Unquestionably,
17. Kant distinguishes between the matter [Materie] and the form of an appearance
[Erscheinung]. See in particular Kant’s Kritik der reinen Vernunft, A 20-A 21 (for
the first edition) and B34-B 35 (for the second edition).
18. [Weyl 1923, 43–44]: “Nach Einstein ist die metrische Struktur der Welt nicht
homogen. Wie ist das möglich, da doch Raum und Zeit Formen der Erscheinungen
sind? Allein dadurch, dass die metrische Struktur nicht a priori fest gegeben ist,
sondern ein Zustandsfeld von physikalischer Realität, das in kausaler Abhängigkeit
steht vom Zustand der Materie.”
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Weyl does not take Kant’s conception of space and time for granted. He
rather underlines the opposition between Kant’s fixed dogmas on space and
Einstein’s recent achievements in general relativity. Weyl is even more explicit
in [Weyl 1988]—which he wrote “in 1925 for the edition of Lobatschefskij’s
works” [Weyl 1988, III]:
the metric structure becomes a field which depends on matter,
it no longer belongs to a stationary homogeneous form of phe-
nomena, on the contrary, it depends on a changeful material
becoming.19
Then, Weyl recalls in [Weyl 1923, 46] that the property of metric
homogeneity is assumed in the case of the classical problem of space, i.e.,
the Riemann-Helmholtz problem of space, which provides a group-theoretical
characterization of Euclidean geometry and non-Euclidean geometries. By
contrast, this property no longer holds globally in his generalized problem of
space [Weyl 1923, 46]. Accordingly, he redefines dramatically the expression
“form of phenomena” in a way that is not Kantian at all. By this expression,
he finally means the set of all properties characterizing “the a priori essence
of space” [das apriorische Wesen des Raumes].20 Moreover, he proves that
the Pythagorean nature of the metric can be determined independently from
any experience. As a consequence, he must abandon his 1918 mathematical
definition of space as a “form of phenomena”, since the nature of the metric
also belongs to the a priori essence of space [Weyl 1922b, 266].
3.2 An explanation for Weyl’s constructivist
interpretation of Husserl’s Wesensanalyse
In the concluding remarks of [Weyl 1923], Weyl underlines that philosophy and
mathematics are closely intertwined in the (exceptional) case of his problem
of space [Weyl 1923, 61]. But it does not imply that the mathematical and
the philosophical part of this problem play equivalent roles in Weyl’s writings.
In fact, it seems obvious that the mathematical analysis of the problem of
space prevails over its philosophical meaning for Weyl. This point is already
suggested by the fact that he generally interprets mathematically most of the
philosophical concepts he uses.
Moreover, at the beginning of [Weyl 1922a], which is reproduced without
any significant change in [Weyl 1923], he expounds with a certain distance a
so-called philosophical point of view on space and time, mainly inspired by
Kant. Accordingly, he defines the philosophical problem of space as follows: it
19. [Weyl 1988, 36, my translation]: “die metrische Struktur wird zu einem
von der Materie abhängigen physikalischen Zustandsfeld, sie gehört nicht mehr
zur ruhenden homogenen Form der Erscheinungen, sondern zum wechselvollen
materiellen Geschehen.”
20. See in particular [Weyl 1922b, 265].
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consists in studying the interconnections between 1. space (or more generally
an extensive medium of the external world), 2. its metrical structure, 3. its
material content. Then, he adopts the viewpoint of the mathematician in
order to underline that the resolution of the philosophical problem of space
must be guided by a theoretical construction based on mathematical principles.
From these principles, Weyl deduces a group-theoretical characterization
of infinitesimally Pythagorean manifolds, which leads to the philosophical
conclusion that the nature of the metric is not a mere convention; on the
contrary, it belongs to the a priori essence of space. Weyl is even more
explicit at the end of § 18 of [Weyl 1952], criticizing “the impatience of
those philosophers who believe it possible to describe adequately the mode
of existence on the basis of a single act of typical presentation”.21 In other
words, only a theoretical construction offers a progressive access to the essence
of space. Weyl’s own writings published between 1918 and 1923 illustrate
this fact: initially convinced that space-time as such is a four-dimensional
topological manifold, he became aware that the Pythagorean nature of the
metric is a characteristic feature of the universe.
From these remarks, it is possible to get a better understanding of
Weyl’s apriorism during the period 1921-1923. In the first section, I have
already underlined that Weyl was strongly opposed to any kind of empiricist
conception of geometry and physics. In the previous subsection, I have shown
that this rejection of empiricism does not lead in any way to a rehabilitation of
Kantianism, although we can find some traces of Kant’s vocabulary especially
in [Weyl 1923]. Finally, the importance granted by Weyl to the mathematical
analysis of the problem of space gives rise to a constructivist interpretation
of Husserl’s Wesensanalyse, which is rightly underlined by M. Friedman
[Friedman 1999, 53]. Moreover, following E. Scholz, I should add that
Weyl mainly refers to Husserl’s phenomenology in order to criticize a strictly
conventionalist conception of our knowledge of space [Weyl 1921a, 133–134],
[Scholz 2016, 269].
It is necessary to recall here that Weyl’s peculiar interpretation of Husserl’s
Wesensanalyse appeared in the fourth edition of Raum, Zeit, Materie dated
1921, i.e., before his discussions with Carnap and Oskar Becker on the problem
of space. Indeed, Carnap’s dissertation was published in 1922 and almost
immediately reviewed by Weyl [Weyl 1922c]; the correspondence between
Becker and Weyl on geometry and physics consisted of four letters of Becker
to Weyl written between April 1923 and October 1924, namely after the
publication of Weyl’s main writings on the problem of space. As pointed out in
[Mancosu & Ryckman 2002, 206], it is chronologically implausible to say that
“Weyl conceives his own analysis of the problem of space as a generalization
and refinement of Becker’s” [Friedman 1999, 54]. However, M. Friedman
21. [Weyl 1921a, 133]: “die Ungeduld der Philosophen [...] die da glauben, auf
Grund eines einzigen Aktes exemplarischer Vergegenwärtigung das Wesen adäquat
beschreiben zu können.” See [Weyl 1952, 148] for an English translation.
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convincingly claims in [Friedman 1999, 47–54] that Weyl and Carnap interpret
Husserl’s Wesensanalyse from two very different perspectives. Carnap’s
dissertation entitled Der Raum [Carnap 1922] begins with a distinction
between formal space, intuitive space and physical space. His inquiry
is based on “Husserl’s concept of “essential insight” [Wesenserschauung]”
[Friedman 1999, 47], which provides the a priori laws of intuitive space,
in particular the property of being infinitesimally (but not globally)
Euclidean [Friedman 1999, 48].
We might think for the moment that Carnap’s and Weyl’s points of
view are very close, except that Weyl works on Pythagorean manifolds in a
generalized sense, not only on Riemannian manifolds. However, Weyl publishes
a harsh review of Carnap’s dissertation in 1922 [Weyl 1922c]. According
to Weyl, Carnap does not make any explicit link between intuitive space
and physical space. It seems easier to understand this objection if we take
into account that they propose two diverging interpretations of Husserl’s
Wesensanalyse. By this expression, Carnap means an immediate grasp of the
a priori laws of intuitive space, whereas it is a phenomenological constitution
of physical space for Weyl, based on a theoretical construction. In other
words, Weyl conceives Husserl’s Wesensanalyse in a constructivist perspective
[Friedman 1999, 53]. For instance, at the end of the § 18 of [Weyl 1952],
Weyl describes:
[t]he historical development of the problem of space [that] teaches
how difficult it is for us human beings entangled in external reality
to reach a definite conclusion.22
In a nutshell, between 1921 and 1923, Weyl’s apriorism can be fully
characterized as follows: (a) the mathematical analysis of the problem of
space provides the a priori laws governing physical space (as an extensive
medium of external reality) which are not mere conventions; (b) as a
consequence, the Pythagorean nature of the metric, which can be determined
purely mathematically, belongs to the a priori essence of space; (c) philo-
sophically, Weyl interprets this mathematical analysis in terms of Husserl’s
Wesensanalyse, considering the latter as a non-ending process implying a
theoretical construction.
In this respect, the role played by Husserl’s philosophy in Weyl’s work
must be significantly minimized. First, Weyl’s explicit references to Husserl
remain very localized and they serve very specific goals; in particular, Weyl
mentions Husserl’s Wesensanalyse in order to criticize empiricism as well as
conventionalism. Therefore, it is impossible to generalize the present statement
about space to other writings, especially his 1918 articles on his purely
infinitesimal geometry. Second, Weyl provides a very specific interpretation
of Husserl’s Wesensanalyse, which is consistent with his assumption according
to which the mathematical analysis of the problem of space plays a guiding
22. [Weyl 1921a, 133] and [Weyl 1952, 147] for the English translation.
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role in order to solve the philosophical problem of space. Third, Fichte’s
idealism remains Weyl’s main source of inspiration in the development of
his constructivism in mathematics as well as in theoretical physics. Indeed,
Weyl finally criticizes “the passive Husserlian viewing of essences” [Sieroka
2009, 93]. It seems now necessary to give a more accurate picture of Weyl’s
“constructivism” in theoretical physics, to which he began to give its final
shape in a series of writings published between 1924 and 1927.
4 Weyl’s holism and physical theories
as symbolic constructions of reality
In this last section, I will focus on Weyl’s epistemological holism and
his underlying constructivism which became a characteristic feature of his
reflections on physical theories around 1924-1925. I will first explain why he
fully develops this philosophical thesis in a series of texts on the foundations of
mathematics. Second, I will show that Weyl is well aware of the philosophical
consequences linked with holism: in particular, under the assumption that
a physical theory must be treated as a whole, it seems impossible to make
a clear distinction between a priori principles and empirical statements.
Third, I will underline the fact that his holistic viewpoint is closely related
to his definition of a physical theory as a symbolic construction of reality.
This might suggest some similarities between Cassirer and Weyl which should
not be carried too far.
4.1 Some important concessions to Hilbert
in theoretical physics
The very first trace of Weyl’s holism can be found in the first edition of
Raum, Zeit, Materie [Weyl 1918b, 60]. However, this kind of thought plays
a very marginal role in Weyl’s writings on general relativity. By contrast,
in [Weyl 1924] and [Weyl 1925], holism becomes central and it is closely
related to his new definition of a physical theory as a symbolic construction of
reality.23 Under this expression, he means that a physical theory is not based
on any intuitive “evidence”. It must rather be conceived as a mathematical
construction, which is not directly linked with empirical data. In other
words, a physical theory represents reality through a system of interrelated
symbols. Yet, in these two writings, Weyl discusses mainly Hilbert’s and
Brouwer’s points of view on the foundations of mathematics. As a consequence,
Weyl’s constructivist and holistic viewpoint in theoretical physics reflects the
evolution of his thoughts on the foundations of mathematics around 1924-1925.
23. See in particular [Weyl 1924, 1925].
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As underlined by P. Mancosu, N. Sieroka and R. Tieszen, Weyl was no
longer satisfied with a strictly intuitionist viewpoint on the foundations of
mathematics around 1924-1925, mainly for pragmatic reasons [Mancosu 1998,
80–81], [Sieroka 2009, 89] and [Tieszen 2000, 274].24 But it does not mean
that he turned away from intuitionism in favor of formalism. In fact, he
“attempts to take a middle stand between Hilbert and Brouwer” [Mancosu
1998, 80]. Weyl’s position on the foundations of mathematics seems quite
ambivalent: “he feels that there is a fundamental gap between the intuitive and
the theoretical or conceptual in mathematics” [Tieszen 2000, 295]; but they
also represent two complementary aspects of mathematics. In this respect,
he distinguishes between “intuitive mathematics” which provides a set of
individual propositions based on intuition and “symbolic mathematics” which
characterizes “the parts of mathematics that cannot be founded on intuition”
[Weyl 1925, 541], [Tieszen 2000, 295].
Accordingly, Weyl uses the term “construction” in two very different ways.
On the one hand, he refers to constructive procedures, as opposed to axiomatic
procedures, in the proof of existence theorems. In this regard, “construction” is
a characteristic feature of intuitive mathematics [Weyl 1927, 41]. In particular,
he was still convinced after 1924-1925 that mathematics would be meaningless
without any explicit construction of mathematical objects. On the other hand,
he also defines the term “construction” as a symbolic representation, which
gives rise to mathematical theories that exceed any intuition. This idea is
tightly related to the very notion of symbolic mathematics. Now, in which
way can we characterize Weyl’s constructivism in theoretical physics?
We might answer this question by referring to the end of [Weyl 1924] where
he claims that theoretical physics provides a kind of knowledge, which strongly
differs from intuitive or phenomenal knowledge, since no single proposition
can receive an (intuitive) meaning by itself in that case. In particular, a
physical law must be regarded as being a part of a whole theory conceived
as a symbolic construction of reality. As a consequence, in his reflections on
the foundations of mathematics, Weyl mentions theoretical physics only when
dealing with symbolic mathematics. Moreover, between 1927 and 1928, he
referred to theoretical physics in order to clarify his position in the debate
opposing Brouwer to Hilbert. In fact, Weyl shows that intuitionism is not
consistent with his holistic conception of a physical theory and he claims that
Hilbert shares this holistic viewpoint with him [Weyl 1927, 49]. Indeed, in his
1927 conference on the foundations of mathematics held in Hamburg, Hilbert
said unambiguously that it is impossible to test a physical theory hypothesis
by hypothesis [Hilbert 1928, 79]. To our knowledge, this is the very first
expression of Hilbert’s holism in physics. In his commentary, Weyl fully agrees
with him on this particular point [Weyl 1928, 87–88].
24. [Sieroka 2009, 89]: “[A]s a practicing mathematician and theoretical physicist
he retreated from the general foundational ambitions of intuitionism.”
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To sum up, in [Weyl 1924] and in [Weyl 1925], Weyl mainly refers to
theoretical physics in order to distance himself from a strictly intuitionist point
of view. But in [Weyl 1927] and in [Weyl 1928], he goes one step further by un-
derlining the irrelevance of intuitionism in theoretical physics. We can measure
now to which extent Weyl’s thoughts on physical theories were related to his
broader reflections on intuitive and symbolic mathematics during the period
1924-1928. In particular, it seems obvious that Hilbert and Weyl share the idea
according to which a physical theory is a set of interrelated symbols. However,
Weyl’s epistemological holism is not inspired by Hilbert for chronological
reasons: it already appears in [Weyl 1918b] and in [Weyl 1924]. Moreover, in
his 1927 conference on the foundations of mathematics, Hilbert only claimed
that propositions in physics are logically interdependent. By contrast, Weyl
defines physical theories as symbolic representations “of the transcendent”
[Weyl 1925, 540], with a clear reference to Fichte at the end of [Weyl 1924].
A better characterization of Weyl’s constructivism is thus needed.
4.2 Duhem, Einstein, Weyl and the relativization
of apriorism
In fact, Weyl’s conception of a physical theory as a symbolic construction of
reality and his corresponding holism are not entirely new in the philosophical
literature on physics. In particular, there are some similarities between his and
Duhem’s epistemological point of view, which is fully developed in [Duhem
1906]. Indeed, the idea according to which only a whole theory can be
empirically tested is formulated for the very first time by Duhem in a series
of articles published at the end of the nineteenth century. He provides then
a detailed account on holism and its philosophical consequences in [Duhem
1906] part II, chapter VI. This book was translated into German by the
socialist activist Friedrich Adler very shortly after,25 making it accessible
to German-speaking scientists and philosophers. Weyl only refers once to
La Théorie physique in the bibliography of [Weyl 1927, § 21]. In this respect,
it seems very difficult to suppose that Weyl’s constructivism is mainly and
directly influenced by Duhem. Nevertheless we would like to put forward
three main points of convergence between Duhem’s and Weyl’s reflections on
theoretical physics.
First, both of them make a clear distinction between direct observation
and experiment which always involves a theoretical interpretation.26 Second,
Weyl’s idea according to which a physical theory is a symbolic construction
of reality is repeatedly expressed in a very similar way by Duhem in [Duhem
1906, part II, chap. V]. Duhem points out, for instance, that physical laws
“are not only abstract; they are, in addition, symbolic, and the symbols
25. [Duhem 1908]. The German edition of [Duhem 1906] is prefaced by Ernst Mach.
26. See in particular [Duhem 1906, 205], [Weyl 1927, 49], [Weyl 1928, 88] and
[Sieroka 2010, 298] for a commentary on this particular point.
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assume meaning only by grace of the physical theories”.27 Third, just like
Duhem, Weyl considers that only a theoretical whole can be empirically tested,
rejecting in particular the possibility of crucial experiments in physics [Sieroka
2010, 303], [Duhem 1906, 262–263].
Moreover, such a holistic point of view is also shared by Einstein. The
latter might have been aware of the existence of [Duhem 1906] in the
early 1910s. At that particular time, Einstein was close to Adler, i.e., the
translator of [Duhem 1906] [Howard 1990, 264]. Indeed, there are several
traces indicating that Einstein fully embraces such a conception of physical
theories. We might refer first to his 1910-1911 lecture notes on electricity and
magnetism; Einstein’s holism is also explicitly expressed in his review of Alfred
Elsbach’s 1924 book entitled Kant und Einstein, [Howard 1990, 371–372].
Assuming that a physical theory consists of closely interrelated propositions,
Einstein points out the arbitrariness of any distinction between a priori and
a posteriori knowledge within a physical theory. In other words, he considers
that holism contradicts the possibility of isolating once and for all a priori
principles in physics.
We would like to show now that Weyl is fully aware of this epistemological
consequence. Therefore, his holistic point of view in physics is a central
ingredient in order to explain why he progressively tempered his previous
apriorism. Indeed, in [Weyl 1927, § 21], Weyl claims unambiguously that it
is impossible in practice to make a clear distinction between a priori and
a posteriori knowledge in physics:
Thus in the practice of scientific research the clear-cut division
into a priori and a posteriori in the Kantian sense is absent, and
in its place we have a rich scale of gradations of stability.28
This argument reminds us of Einstein’s thoughts in his review of Elsbach’s
book. By contrast, Weyl still repeats in [Weyl 1927, 95–100] the conclusions
of his philosophical analysis of the problem of space which lead to “a clear-cut
division into a priori and a posteriori” statements. As a consequence, there is
apparently a contradiction in Weyl’s thoughts. In fact, we need to recall that
he does not aim at building up a perfectly consistent philosophical system in
[Weyl 1927]: different steps in the development of his philosophical reflections
seem to coexist and each of these steps is related to a specific topic.
As underlined in the previous subsection, holism in theoretical physics is a
central argument used by Weyl in order to distance himself from intuitionism
27. [Duhem 1906, 234]: “[les idées qui composent une loi physique] ne sont
pas seulement abstraites, elles sont, de plus, symboliques, et les symboles qu’elles
constituent ne prennent un sens que grâce aux théories physiques.” English
translation in [Duhem 1954, 166].
28. [Weyl 1927, 114]: “So existiert in der Praxis der naturwissenschaftlichen Arbeit
nicht der schroffe Gegensatz von a priori und a posteriori im Kantischen Sinne,
sondern eine reiche Stufenskala der Festigkeit.” English translation in [Weyl 1949,
153–154].
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and to make a series of concessions to Hilbert. Moreover, this holistic point
of view is also inspired by Einstein and it leads to a relativization of Weyl’s
previous apriorism. Nevertheless, the very notion of symbolic construction,
which is central in Weyl’s conception of a physical theory, does not appear
in any of Einstein’s writings. Therefore, it seems necessary to compare it
to Cassirer’s philosophy of symbolic forms, in order to fully characterize
Weyl’s constructivism.
4.3 Cassirer and Weyl on symbolic constructions
Within the general framework of his philosophy of symbolic forms, Cassirer
conceived mathematics and natural sciences as symbolic constructions, re-
minding us of Weyl’s definition of a physical theory. We will see below that
this argument needs to be balanced. But we would like first to put forward the
role played by Cassirer in the promotion of Duhem’s epistemological holism
among German-speaking philosophers and scientists. It is highly plausible
that Weyl discovered [Duhem 1906] through Cassirer. Indeed, in § 21 of [Weyl
1927], Weyl mentions almost simultaneously [Duhem 1906], [Cassirer 1910,
1921]. Cassirer referred precisely to Duhem’s distinction between physical laws
and phenomenal knowledge in Substanzbegriff und Funktionsbegriff [Cassirer
1910, 190]. Cassirer even extended Duhem’s thoughts to special and general
relativity in [Cassirer 1921, 10]. Only two years after the publication of Weyl’s
Philosophie der Mathematik und Naturwissenschaft, Cassirer mentioned again
Duhem in the third volume of his Philosophie der symbolischen Formen
[Cassirer 1929]. At that particular time, he made an explicit link between
holism and symbolic constructions. The similarities between Cassirer’s and
Weyl’s reflections become now very obvious [Sieroka 2010, 312–314]. Although
they agree to a certain extent on the definition and the structure of a physical
theory, there are no mutual influences between them during the 1920s.
For sure, Weyl was invited in February 1928 at the University of Hamburg
and met Cassirer on this occasion. More specifically, at the end of 1927, Weyl
received a first invitation from his friend Erich Hecke, a specialist in number
theory, to give a talk on group theory and quantum mechanics in Hamburg
University.29 At the very beginning of 1928, Weyl received a second invitation
from Cassirer to address the Philosophical Society of Hamburg on Philosophie
der Mathematik und Naturwissenschaft.30 At that time, Cassirer was about
to publish the last volume of his Philosophie der symbolischen Formen, in
which he discusses very precisely Weyl’s arguments on the foundations of
mathematics, as they are developed in [Weyl 1925, 1927]. In particular,
Cassirer criticizes Weyl’s opposition between intuition and theory, as it is
29. See Hecke’s letter to Weyl dated November 28, 1927, ETH-Bibliothek, Hs 91:
595. For an analysis of the Hecke-Weyl correspondence, see in particular [Eckes 2016].
30. See Cassirer’s letter to Weyl from January 18, 1928, ETH-Bibliothek, Hs 91:
506. Cassirer was well aware of Hecke’s first invitation.
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expressed in [Weyl 1925, 541]. According to Cassirer, Weyl’s reflections
are based on old metaphysical dualisms. Cassirer disputes more specifically
the existence of a theoretical “need” [Bedürfnis] which would lead to “a
symbolic representation of the transcendent” [symbolische Darstellung des
Transzendenten] [Weyl 1925, 542]. Indeed, in his philosophy of symbolic forms,
Cassirer rejects any reference to a so-called “transcendent” beyond symbols. In
fact, as pointed out by N. Sieroka, Weyl’s constructivism rests on a particular
interpretation of Fichtean philosophy, mainly inspired by his colleague Fritz
Medicus at the Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule [Sieroka 2009, 91].
Indeed, Weyl explicitly refers to Fichte in [Weyl 1925, 540]. Moreover, Weyl
uses expressions such as “lively theoretical need” [lebendig[es] theoretisches
Bedürfnis] or “mind’s vital process” [Lebensprozess des Geistes] which suggest
to the reader that his reflections belong to a kind of “Lebensphilosophie”. By
contrast, Cassirer’s philosophy of symbolic forms is dominated by the concept
of spirit [Geist], with a clear reference to phenomenology in an Hegelian sense
at the very beginning of [Cassirer 1929]. N. Sieroka has rightly pointed out
that these differences between Cassirer and Weyl reflect a broader opposition
between two forms of neo-Kantian philosophy; the Marburg School and the
Southwest (German) School [Sieroka 2010, 324]. This opposition leads to a
full characterization of Weyl’s constructivist and holistic viewpoint in physics,
which is clearly inspired by a certain interpretation of Fichte’s philosophy, not
by Cassirer’s philosophy of symbolic forms.
5 Concluding remarks
To sum up, I have identified three interrelated steps in the development of
Weyl’s philosophy of physics between 1918 and 1927. First, in 1918-1921,
Weyl’s reflections can be characterized as a kind of speculative apriorism for
the following reason: he strongly believes that a suitable generalization of
Riemannian geometry must lead to an empirically consistent theory. His
unified field theory and his underlying speculative approach are precisely
at the core of the so-called Freundlich-Haas-Reichenbach-Weyl controversy.
Weyl rejects Freundlich’s strictly empiricist views; neither is he convinced by
Reichenbach’s relativized apriorism. However, Reichenbach’s strong criticisms
against the “pre-Kantian” views of Haas and Weyl might partly explain why
the latter finally abandons his early speculative approach around 1921.
Second, Weyl recognizes at that particular time that his unified field theory
is not empirically founded and that it is not possible to deduce a priori
a physical theory from a geometric framework. However, in his writings
on the problem of space, which were mainly published between 1921 and
1923, he claims that any physical theory is based on an “a priori element”.
The mathematical analysis of the problem of space can be considered as
a characterization of this element: the Pythagorean nature of the metric
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depends upon purely mathematical principles; as a consequence, it belongs
to “the a priori essence of space”. This expression reminds us of Husserl’s
phenomenology. More precisely, following M. Friedman, I have tried to explain
that Weyl develops a constructivist interpretation of Husserl’s Wesensanalyse.
Nevertheless, I strongly disagree with M. Friedman when he claims that Weyl’s
apriorism is also deeply influenced by Kant. I have shown that it is not the
case, although Weyl repeatedly used Kant’s vocabulary in 1918 and later on
in 1921-1923 as well.
Third, Weyl’s philosophy of physics took its final shape around the years
1924-1925 in the context of the controversy opposing Brouwer to Hilbert on
the foundations of mathematics. Weyl finally defines a physical theory as a
symbolic construction of reality and he shows that only a theory as a whole
can be empirically tested. In other words, his philosophy of physics can
be characterized as a constructivism and, accordingly, as a holism. These
views play a central role in his broader reflections on physics as well as on
mathematics: first, it partly explains why he distanced himself from intuition-
ism around 1924-1925; second, why it led to give his previous apriorism a
milder drift and foreshadowed his later empirical turn which would occur at
the end of the 1920s within his work on quantum mechanics; third, it shows
that Fichtean philosophy still remained an important source of inspiration
for Weyl in the mid-1920s.
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